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MAGNA CARTA FOR THE WORLD? THE
MERCHANTS’ CHAPTER AND FOREIGN
CAPITAL IN THE EARLY AMERICAN
REPUBLIC*
DANIEL HULSEBOSCH**
All merchants may safely and securely go out of England, and
come into England, and delay and pass through England, as well
by land as by water, for the purpose of buying and selling, free
from all evil taxes, subject to the ancient and right customs—save
in time of war, and if they are of the land at war against us. And
if such be found in our land at the beginning of the war, they
shall be held, without harm to their bodies and goods, until it
shall be known to us or our chief justice how the merchants of
our land are to be treated who shall, at that time, be found in the
land at war against us. And if ours shall be safe there, the others
shall be safe in our land.
—MAGNA CARTA CH. 41/30, “THE MERCHANTS’
CHAPTER”1

* © 2016 Daniel Hulsebosch.
** Drafts were presented at the American Historical Association Conference,
January 2015; The British Legal History Conference, July 2015; Celebrating 800 Years of
Magna Carta Conference, University of North Carolina School of Law, October 2015; 800
Years of the Magna Carta Symposium, Classical Liberal Institute, New York University,
November 2015; and the Tel Aviv University Law School Legal History Workshop,
December 2015. The author is especially grateful for comments from Alfred Brophy,
Richard Epstein, Joshua Getzler, David Golove, Paul Halliday, Ron Harris, Roy Kreitner,
Adam Lebovitz, Doreen Lustig, Uday Mehta, James Pfander, Steve Pincus, and Nicholas
Vincent. He is also grateful for the support of the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E.
Greenberg Faculty Research Fund, N.Y.U. School of Law.
1. MAGNA CARTA ch. 41 (1215), reprinted and translated in SELECT HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 135, 142 (Ernest F. Henderson ed. & trans., New
York 1965). It is chapter 41 in the original 1215 charter and chapter 30 in the so-called
statutory version of 1225. Relying on Sir Edward Coke’s seventeenth-century translation
as their source, most eighteenth-century commentators cited the 1225 version. See, e.g.,
EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ch.
30, at *57.
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This Article examines the early modern revival and subtle
transformation in what is here called the merchants’ chapter of
Magna Carta and then analyzes how lawyers, judges, and
government officeholders invoked it in the new American federal
courts and in debates over congressional power. In the U.S.
Supreme Court in the early 1790s, a British creditor and an
American State debated the meaning and applicability of the
merchants’ chapter, which guaranteed two rights to foreign
merchants: free entry and exit during peacetime, without being
subjected to arbitrary taxes; and, in wartime, the promise that
their persons and goods would not be harmed or confiscated,
unless their own king attacked and confiscated English
merchants. In other words, no harm to enemy aliens, except as
retaliation. Tit for tat.
The idea that reciprocity was a fundamental mechanism of
international (and interpersonal) relations became something
like a social science axiom in the early modern Enlightenment.
Edward Coke claimed to find that mechanism in the merchants’
chapter and publicized it to lawyers throughout the emerging
British Empire and beyond. Montesquieu lauded the English for
protecting foreign commerce in their fundamental law, and
Blackstone basked in that praise. American lawyers derived their
understanding of the merchants’ chapter from these sources and
then, in the early Republic, stretched the principle behind it to
protect foreign capital, not just resident merchants. The
vindication of old imperial debt contracts would signal to all
international creditors that, in the United States, credit was safe.
Federalists then invoked the chapter outside of the courts to resist
Republican attempts to embargo commerce and sequester foreign
credit. For Republicans, doux commerce had become the
Achilles heel of the great Atlantic empires: their reliance on
American trade could be used to gain diplomatic leverage
without risking war. For Federalists, economic sanctions
threatened not just their fiscal policy but their entire vision of an
Atlantic world that increasingly insulated international capital
from national politics. They all agreed, however, that the role of
foreign capital in the American constitutional system was a
central issue for the new and developing nation.

94 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2016)

2016]

MAGNA CARTA FOR THE WORLD?

1601

I.

PLEADING ENGLISH RIGHTS IN POST-COLONIAL
AMERICA..................................................................................... 1601
II.
THE MERCHANTS’ CHAPTER IN EARLY MODERN
EUROPE: COKE, MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE .................... 1608
A. Edward Coke and “Merchant Strangers” .......................... 1608
B. The Merchants’ Chapter in the Enlightenment:
Montesquieu ......................................................................... 1613
C. Proximate Authority: Blackstone’s Gloss on Magna
Carta and Montesquieu ....................................................... 1616
III. FOREIGN MERCHANTS AND REVOLUTIONARY
COMMERCE ................................................................................. 1618
A. Judicial Interpretation of Creditors’ Rights: The
Brailsford Case .................................................................... 1619
B. Creditors’ Rights in the Political Branches in the 1790s ... 1626
CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTING A FISCAL-COMMERCIAL STATE..... 1632

I. PLEADING ENGLISH RIGHTS IN POST-COLONIAL AMERICA
Magna Carta appears in the strangest places. Mythical figures
often do. Broad relevance and persistence are central to their
mystique. Yet omnipresence also strains credulity. For lawyers, at
least, a legal myth’s power is usually taken for granted, and the
pertinent questions concern what the myth means, whether it applies
to the problem at hand, and, if so, how. Historians, on the other hand,
ask questions of epistemology and effect rather than exegesis: Why
did those historical actors think it was useful to invoke the myth at
that moment, what work did they want it to accomplish, and did they
succeed? Why, for example, did American judges and lawyers invoke
one chapter of Magna Carta, what here is called “the merchants’
chapter,” in one of the earliest cases to reach the Supreme Court of
the United States?
The short answer is international credit—in all senses of that
term. In the early 1790s, the U.S. Supreme Court tried a case between
the state of Georgia and a foreign British merchant who had extended
credit to a colonist before the American Revolution.2 The legal
dispute began in 1791 when the British creditor, Samuel Brailsford,

2. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 1–2 (1794). Many primary source
documents for this case are published in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1800 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds.,
Columbia Univ. Press 1998) [hereinafter 6 DHSC].
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sought to collect that seventeen-year-old debt and sued his debtor,
James Spalding, directly in the Federal Circuit Court.3 Brailsford had
sold Spalding a “cargo” of slaves in 1774; in return Spalding had
tendered a bond valued, in 1791, at over seven thousand pounds.4
Brailsford’s attorney pleaded in the Federal Circuit Court that the
plaintiffs were “aliens, and subjects of his Britannick Majesty,”
providing jurisdiction on the basis of the court’s alienage jurisdiction.5
The substantive rule of decision, according to the plaintiffs, was the
Treaty of Peace of 1783, which provided that both sides would place
“no lawful impediment[s]” in the way of debt collection.6 Despite its
formal equality, everyone knew this was a one-way provision:
Americans owed millions of pounds to Britons stemming from prerevolutionary mercantile debt, not vice versa.7
Attorneys for the debtor argued instead that the State had
confiscated all debts owed to Britons, whether it had actually
collected the money from patriot debtors or not.8 Confiscations
3. Brailsford sued on behalf of himself and two partners, Robert William Powell and
John Hopton. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 74. Spalding in turn was the named plaintiff in an
action against him and partners Roger Kelsall and Job Cockton. Id. Two different sections
of the Georgia confiscation statute of 1782 covered Brailsford, on the one hand, and his
partners, on the other. One section affected debts owed by Georgia citizens, like Spalding,
to British creditors, like Brailsford. The other covered property owned and debts owing in
Georgia to persons whose property was confiscated in other states, like South Carolina.
This section covered the other two partners, who were stipulated to be South Carolina
citizens. See id. at 86.
4. Id. at 74 & n.7. Liberal sales of goods on credit characterized imperial trade
before the Revolution. See, e.g., JACOB M. PRICE, CAPITAL AND CREDIT IN BRITISH
OVERSEAS TRADE: THE VIEW FROM THE CHESAPEAKE, 1700–1776, at 13–17 (1980)
(discussing debt and credit in colonial America).
5. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 74; see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
Whether all or some of the plaintiffs were actually aliens is historically unclear, but as a
legal matter, the parties ultimately agreed that Brailsford, who went from the colonies to
Britain in 1767 and evidently remained there during the war, was an alien. 6 DHSC, supra
note 2, at 74–75. The federal courts concluded that Powell and Hopton, however, were
South Carolina citizens who had become Loyalists. Id. at 75. The difference between those
whom the new Americans classified as “real British Subjects” (in the words of Article V of
the Treaty of Peace) and those they classified as state citizens who turned Loyalist is a
knotty historical problem, especially when applied to people who were not born in the
colonies but who resided in them for many years before the Revolution. The
distinguishing feature of Brailsford’s biography seems to have been that he left the
colonies well before the Revolution; the others fled after it began.
6. Definitive Treaty of Peace, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. IV, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80, 82.
7. See id. For the problem of debts in the making of the Constitution and the early
federal courts, see Charles F. Hobson, The Recovery of British Debts in the Federal Circuit
Court of Virginia, 1790 to 1797, 92 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 176, 180–83 (1984);
Brent Tarter & Wythe Holt, The Apparent Political Selection of Federal Grand Juries in
Virginia, 1789–1809, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 259–60 (2007).
8. See infra notes 73–83 and accompanying text.
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completed during the war, they argued, were not the postwar
impediments envisioned by the treaty-makers. Georgia then
interpleaded in the cause to supplant the British creditor, claiming
that it owned the debt.9
A case between a British creditor and an American State
commencing in 1791 and dealing with the messy legal aftermath of the
Revolution seems an unlikely place to find Magna Carta. But there it
was: the parties debated the relevance of the second part of the
merchants’ chapter, safeguarding foreign merchants and their goods
during war, unless their own governments targeted resident English
merchants. In other words, no harm to enemy aliens except as
retaliation. Tit for tat. Attorneys for the creditor and at least two
judges invoked the merchants’ chapter to help find that Georgia—
despite the State’s protests—had not confiscated British debts during
the war. They attributed to Georgia’s wartime legislators a desire to
treat British creditors reciprocally, as American creditors were
treated in Britain, and supposed that the merchants’ chapter had
influenced the legislators’ decision. In fact, Britain had not
confiscated debts owed to Americans during the war. Ergo, Georgia
refrained as well.
The idea that reciprocity was a fundamental mechanism of
international (and interpersonal) relations became something like a
social science axiom in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment.10 It was
central to this federal debt case, the participants’ reading of Magna
Carta, and many Americans’ understanding of their constitutional
and commercial environment in the political branches as well as the
courts. Attorney General William Bradford argued that the
merchants’ chapter stood for the proposition “[t]hat the faith of

9. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 76. The defendant debtor did not consent, which created
a knotty legal problem: could a third-party claimant interplead into an action at common
law against the defendant’s will? The blackletter answer was no. See id. at 77. That is why
the State moved in equity. However, most of the judges believed that the State did not
satisfy the requirements for an equitable remedy because a satisfactory legal remedy
remained: it could await the outcome of the suit between the creditor and debtor, and if
the creditor won, it could sue the creditor. See id. at 83. However, Georgia feared that the
debtor would not adequately protect the State’s interest and that the British creditor
would leave the country with his damages before it could sue. See id. These two factors
swayed the Justices, and the Supreme Court permitted the State to interplead and
effectively take over the defense of the debtor’s position. See id. at 77–84.
10. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 48–56 (1977); ISTVAN HONT,
JEALOUSY OF TRADE: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND THE NATION-STATE IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 6–8 (2005).
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Commercial intercourse ought not to be violated.”11 What was at
stake was not just past promises. The vindication of old debt contracts
would, he argued, also ensure the “[p]rospect of future Credit.”12
Scrupulous repayment would signal to lenders across the Atlantic
that, in the United States, credit was safe. In reply, attorneys for the
debtor and State, one of whom was unofficial court reporter
Alexander Dallas, argued that the laws of war recognized the power
of confiscation, regardless of what Magna Carta might prohibit in
Britain, and the sovereign State of Georgia had exercised that
power.13 The law of nations was not univocal on the question of
whether belligerent nations could confiscate private debts: as a matter
of state practice and treaty commitments, nations were increasingly
reluctant to do so; and eighteenth-century jurists had begun to
question the right.14 Still, traditional authority firmly supported a
belligerent’s right to confiscate enemy debt along with other personal
property located in its jurisdiction. The important point for Georgia
was that the early modern law of nations was the relevant source of
law, not the medieval fundament of England’s ancient constitution.
During the war, Georgia was an independent nation rather than a
province of England.
No one argued that Magna Carta alone was binding law. Instead,
its adherents argued that it provided persuasive authority for a procommercial interpretation of Georgia’s revolutionary confiscation
statute and the peace treaty’s protection of debts. As Supreme Court
Justice James Iredell put it when holding that the British creditor
retained a right to collect the debt: “[Magna Carta is] dear to all
11. William Bradford, Jr.’s Notes for Argument in the Supreme Court (Feb. 4, 1794),
reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 158, 165. Bradford and, in an earlier stage of
litigation, Attorney General Edmund Randolph did not participate in their official
capacity as executive officers. Instead, they represented the British creditor as part of their
private practice. However, Associate Justice Iredell early on alerted President George
Washington and Randolph to the gravity of the case, and Randolph and Bradford typically
participated only in the highest profile cases as private attorneys while in office. 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1800,
at 239–42, 242 n.5 (1988). The case also raised tricky procedural issues surrounding
Georgia’s interpleader into the original suit between Brailsford and his debtors. See
Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 416–18 (1793); Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 402, 406–07 (1792).
12. William Bradford, Jr.’s Notes for Argument in the Supreme Court, supra note 11,
at 165.
13. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 134–35 (noting that Georgia’s attorney invoked Vattel
for the proposition that “[a] Sovereign has a right to confiscate Debts or any real or
personal Estate”).
14. See infra notes 115, 133–49 (referring to Alexander Hamilton’s arguments in The
Defence).
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Friends of Liberty, in which our Ancestors and those of the present
Inhabitants of Great Britain had a common participation, and which
in many of its parts we still cherish with the highest veneration.”15
Even in revolution, England’s ancient constitution informed
American constitutionalism. Shifting to the laws of war, Iredell
acknowledged that many authorities on the law of nations recognized
a belligerent’s power to confiscate debts in wartime; nonetheless, the
trend within the law of nations, in both practice and jurisprudence,
was toward forbidding confiscation.16
Soon after, the merchants’ chapter played another cameo role in
political debates over the degree to which this self-consciously
developing nation should use economic sanctions as diplomatic
weapons against the stronger Atlantic empires.17 When nascent
Jeffersonian Republicans proposed embargoes and debt
sequestration in retaliation against the belligerents involved in the
wars of the French Revolution, which were harassing neutral trade on
the high seas, Alexander Hamilton invoked the merchants’ chapter,
along with the liberal trend of the law of nations condemning debt
confiscation, as sources of an implied constitutional limitation against
the sequestration of debt.18 The Anglo-American Jay Treaty of 1794
then explicitly prohibited debt sequestration as a diplomatic tool in
15. James Iredell’s Circuit Court Opinion (May 2, 1792), reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra
note 2, at 102, 105. Technically, Iredell gave this Circuit Court decision in the contest
between the creditor and the individual debtor, but Georgia was already seeking to
interplead. In a suggestive account, Thomas H. Lee argues that chapter 41 of Magna Carta
influenced the passage of the section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 now known as the Alien
Tort Statute, which provides federal court jurisdiction in “all causes where an alien sues
for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or of a treaty of the United States.”
Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
830, 837 (2006); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77. But he does not
provide evidence that the drafters or users of that statute invoked the chapter.
16. James Iredell’s Circuit Court Opinion, supra note 15, at 106.
17. The United States is sometimes seen as the first developing nation or “first new
nation.” See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, THE FIRST NEW NATION: THE UNITED STATES
IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 15 (1963); RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE
EMERGING NATIONS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1 (1970). Its priority, however,
depends on the definition of a “developing nation.” The Netherlands, while gaining
independence from Spain, for example, shared some features of early America, including
its innovative banking system, which Hamilton deliberately imitated. However, the
Netherlands possessed much internal capital. Post-revolutionary Americans, on the other
hand, needed to lure foreign capital. Much of early American legal and constitutional
history can therefore be understood as a series of institutional experiments designed to
attract foreign investment while also preserving political freedom of action. This is a major
theme in my forthcoming book with David Golove, A CIVILIZED NATION: WAR AND
TRADE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1776–1815
(forthcoming).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 133–37.
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war or peace.19 In constitutional debates in the political branches as
well as in the courts, the merchants’ chapter remained alive as a
source of constitutional morality.
Magna Carta had earlier become part of imperial constitutional
myth. Colonists had invoked it when proclaiming the principles of no
taxation without representation and trial by jury.20 The
revolutionaries drew on the so-called due process provision of Magna
Carta when writing state constitutions during the war.21 Now, after
political separation, that transatlantic myth still informed American
constitutional argument. It shaded the interpretation of a
revolutionary statute, giving the federal judges authority to bend the
law away from Georgia’s immediate fiscal interest and toward what
Federalists saw as international credit for the whole nation over the
long term. The upshot was that the British creditor could collect from
his American debtor. And if Georgia had already collected money
from patriotic citizens who owed old debts to British merchants, the
implication was that British creditors could sue Georgia too.
Two aspects of this use of Magna Carta in the 1790s are
noteworthy. First, Magna Carta not only escaped England—it
escaped the British Empire into the post-colonial United States.
Second, and more interesting, Magna Carta had never been solely
concerned with the rights of Englishmen, imperial subjects, or even
Anglo-Americans. From the beginning it contained some rights for
foreign merchants—for “strangers” and “aliens,” in the legal terms of
medieval and early modern England. Most scholars and lawyers can
19. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (Jay Treaty), Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. X,
Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116, 122.
20. Colonial Americans linked the representation principle to Magna Carta articles 12
and 14, and they framed their objection to juryless courts, distant venues, and innovative
statutory law in the language of due process that resonated with article 29. See EDMUND S.
MORGAN, PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP
ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, at 52 (1959) (reproducing colonial petitions objecting to the Stamp
Act as violating Magna Carta); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 166–67, 232–33 (1986)
(discussing the revolutionaries’ invocation of Magna Carta).
21. MAGNA CARTA ch. 39, reprinted and translated in SELECT HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES, supra note 1, at 142 (providing that “[n]o freeman
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way harmed—
nor will we go upon or send upon him—save by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land”); see, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XII (stating that “no subject shall be
arrested, imprisoned, despoiled or deprived of his property, immunities or privileges, put
out of the protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty or estate, but by the
judgment of his peers, or the law of the land”); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 9 (providing that no
one can “be justly deprived of his liberty, except by the laws of the land or judgment of his
peers”); VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 8 (1776) (providing that “no man be deprived
of his liberty except by the law of the land, or the judgment of his peers”).
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intuit how Americans grabbed hold of the medieval charter and made
it their own. But how did aliens enter the picture?
The fact that Magna Carta, a document often portrayed as the
“birthright”22 of native Englishmen, actually protected the rights of
foreigners is significant.23 More important is the fact that Sir Edward
Coke attached a pro-commercial gloss to the chapter in the
seventeenth century, and Enlightenment thinkers like Montesquieu
and Sir William Blackstone celebrated that interpretation in the
generation before the American Revolution. All of their books were
widely available in America and cited in the new federal courts.
This Article examines the early modern revival of and subtle
transformation in the merchants’ chapter and then analyzes how
lawyers, judges, and government officeholders invoked it in both the
new American federal courts and debates over congressional power.
Part II investigates the early modern sources available to Americans
that shaped their understanding of the merchants’ chapter. Part III
analyzes the Brailsford case in the federal courts, particularly how
lawyers and judges used the chapter to help interpret wartime
confiscation statutes. Part III then turns to debates in the political
branches about foreign capital, focusing on Jeffersonian Republican
proposals to introduce economic sanctions as a new mechanism of
diplomacy and, in response, Alexander Hamilton’s invocation of the
merchants’ chapter in his interpretation of the protections of foreign
capital under the Constitution and the law of nations. The Article
concludes by suggesting that the career of the merchants’ chapter in
the early United States indicates the ways it was a fiscal-commercial
state.

22. Edward Coke repeatedly used the term “birthright” to describe key sections of
Magna Carta, but as shown below, Coke also recognized the extra-national dimension of
other clauses. For a characteristically nativist and enormously influential interpretation of
Magna Carta as the cornerstone of the early modern English Constitution, see HENRY
CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT’S INHERITANCE (5th ed.,
Boston 1721). Many editions followed, including many printed in British America.
23. It should not surprise medievalists familiar with pre-national legal doctrines in
Europe. It nonetheless surprises some historians of the document: “That alien merchants
were aware of chapter 30 and its value to them is apparent from an episode of 1320, odd as
it seems to hear an appeal to the Charter from men bearing the names of Bonus Philippi,
Dinus Forcetti, and Manenttus Francisci!” FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE
IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, 1300–1629, at 111 (1948) (emphasis
added).
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II. THE MERCHANTS’ CHAPTER IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE:
COKE, MONTESQUIEU, BLACKSTONE
This Article does not attempt to provide a comprehensive history
of the merchants’ chapter between 1215 and the American
Revolution. Instead it explores how American lawyers and judges
understood the merchants’ chapter. When they looked back at Magna
Carta, what did they see? Through what lenses and against what
background did they evaluate Magna Carta? Americans did not have
access to some ideal, objective history of the chapter, nor any part of
Magna Carta. That did not exist then (if ever it could). They also did
not have access to the bulk of medieval and early modern legal
learning about Magna Carta, because that was largely contained in
manuscript cases and readings in the English Inns of Court, much of
which is only now being recovered by historians.24 Americans did,
however, have ready access to the canonical printed texts of English
law, such as Sir Edward Coke’s seventeenth-century Institutes of the
Law of England and Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the
Laws of England, published in the decade before the Revolution. In
addition, they possessed many copies of Montesquieu’s Spirit of the
Laws, a popular Enlightenment text and the most influential book on
comparative legal and governmental institutions for generations. In
these widely circulating texts, Americans found impeccable authority
for connecting international commerce to fundamental law.25 Indeed,
the nexus was, according to these writers, a progressive catalyst for
human civilization.
A. Edward Coke and “Merchant Strangers”
Although it is wrong to say that the prolific early seventeenthcentury jurist Edward Coke rescued Magna Carta from medieval
obscurity,26 he did translate it from Latin and gloss it in influential, if

24. Prominently, by Sir John Baker. See generally Sir John H. Baker, Lecture at a
Meeting of the American Inns of Court Foundation in Washington D.C.: Magna Carta:
The Emergence of the Myth, Presented at the N.Y.U. Legal and Constitutional History
Colloquium (Oct. 23, 2015) (on file with author). According to Baker, there does not
appear to have been a stand-alone reading, or learned lecture, on the merchants’ chapter,
as there was for the more famous chapter 29 guaranteeing due process according to the
law of the land. At least, such a reading has not so far been discovered. See id.
25. On the availability of legal texts before and after the Revolution, see Daniel J.
Hulsebosch, An Empire of Law: Chancellor Kent and the Revolution in Books in the Early
Republic, 60 ALA. L. REV. 377 (2009).
26. This was more or less Edward Jenks’s view. See Edward Jenks, The Myth of
Magna Carta, 4 INDEP. REV. 260, 272–73 (1904). But see Max Radin, The Myth of Magna
Carta, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1060–62 (1947) (arguing against Jenks’s view).
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not historically faithful, ways. Coke devoted the second volume of his
Institutes of the Laws of England to an examination of “many ancient
and other statutes.”27 He began with Magna Carta, which he observed
was called the Great Charter not because of its size (other statutes
were longer) but rather because of “the great importance, and
weightinesse of the matter.”28 The Magna Carta that emerged from
Coke’s second Institutes, published posthumously during the English
Civil War, was no longer a charter of barons. It was the touchstone of
national liberties.29
Yet for a writer so long charged with intellectual parochialism,
his treatment of the merchants’ chapter is surprisingly catholic. “The
end of this chapter was for advancement of trade, and traffique,”
Coke wrote in his gloss, “the meanes for the well using, and intreating
of merchant strangers in all the particulars aforesaid, is a matter of
great moment . . . for as they be used here, so our merchants shall be
dealt withall in other countries.”30 Glossing another chapter, Coke
maintained that
trade and traffique is the livelihood of a merchant, and the life
of the commonwealth, wherein the king and every subject hath
interest, for the merchant is the good bayliffe of the realme to
export and vent the native commodities of the realme, and to
import and bring in the necessary commodities for the defence
and benefit of the realme.31
Here, as elsewhere, Coke pushed English jurisprudence toward
economic openness and experimentation.32
Two striking concepts emerge in Coke’s treatment of the rights
of what he called “merchant strangers.”33 First, rights for foreigners in
England would induce reciprocal treatment for English merchants
abroad. Second, the merchants were not just a private interest group.
Instead, they could be analogized to public servants—bailiffs—who in
Coke’s period were sheriffs’ assistants who executed the writs that
began litigation and enforced the judgments that ended it. Coke

27. COKE, supra note 1, at title page.
28. Id. at *A4.
29. For the reinvention of Magna Carta among common lawyers in Coke’s
generation, see Baker, supra note 24.
30. COKE, supra note 1, ch. 30, at *58.
31. Id. ch. 14, at *28.
32. For Coke’s economic liberalism, see Donald O. Wagner, Coke and the Rise of
Economic Liberalism, 6 ECON. HIST. REV. 30 (1935).
33. COKE, supra note 1, ch. 30, at *57.

94 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2016)

1610

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

defined bailiff as “a safe keeper or protector.”34 So too were
merchants: with them lay the health, welfare, and defense of the
realm.
Therefore, it was in England’s interest to protect merchant
strangers because that protection would be reciprocated abroad. It is
a surprisingly sociable premise for a jurist so long associated with
jealous concern for England and aversion to everything continental.35
There is some of that national exceptionalism in Coke’s account of
the chapter’s origins and effects. Coke implied that the merchants’
chapter was a work of English genius, not a fragment of a common
European culture.36 Once issued, other nations would respond to
what England did and open their trade to match the openness of
England. So England was pushing to open up trade among the
European nations.
Coke extended the obvious reciprocal dynamic of the chapter’s
second right, covering merchants in wartime, to the peacetime right to
be free of arbitrary taxes. More trade would benefit England, but
trade required openness—not just domestic openness, as in his
crusade against royal monopolies,37 but also openness to international
trade. The grant of rights—here, rights to foreign merchants—
generated strength for the whole nation. In a fundamental insight lost
on many modern theorists of liberty and the liberal state, Coke saw
that liberty does not necessarily trade off from power. Liberty helps
generate power. Liberal trade, not war, would build the state through
the strength of its subjects. A liberal state requires tremendous
34. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND ch. 10, § 79, at *61b–62a.
35. See generally RICHARD HELGERSON, FORMS OF NATIONHOOD: THE
ELIZABETHAN WRITING OF ENGLAND 88–101 (1992) (discussing Coke’s legacy in English
legal thought); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW
(1957) (discussing English constitutionalism in the seventeenth century).
36. For countering views, see R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the ius commune, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (1999) (suggesting the merchants’ chapter was influenced by ius
commune); infra Section II.C (discussing Blackstone’s gloss of Magna Carta). Helmholz
shows that the merchants’ chapter was not wholly innovative in substance but of course
cannot demonstrate the direct influence on the drafters. See also Thomas J. McSweeney,
Magna Carta, Civil Law, and Canon Law, in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW
281, 283 (Daniel Barstow Magraw et al. eds., 2014) (arguing that the language of ius
commune was useful to drafters attempting to translate local grievances into forms legible
abroad, particularly in Rome).
37. See Darcy v. Allein (1603) 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B.); Jacob I. Corré, The
Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1262–66 (1996).
Coke also located the antimonopoly principle in chapter 30: “all monopolies concerning
trade and traffique, are against the liberty and freedome, declared and graunted by this
great charter, and against divers other acts of parliament . . . .” COKE, supra note 1, ch. 30,
at *62.
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authority if it is to challenge lesser authorities within it and vindicate
what Coke repeatedly called “liberty of the subject.”38 In turn, the
increasing wealth of those subjects contributed to state power. Coke
was not known for high-level abstraction. His jurisprudence was
deeply, sometimes fantastically, empirical.39 In this instance, however,
he developed a functional analysis that went well beyond that
suggested in the text of Magna Carta.
The premise of his pre-Englightenment conception of
international relations might be called a realist sociability. Coke did
not write of the sweetness of commerce. He did not posit a natural
affinity of humans across political boundaries such that, even in the
state of nature, they congregated instinctively and not just for the
functional purpose of improving their solitary, nasty, brutish, and
short lives. Instead, he assumed that trade was good because it
increased wealth for the English nation, and an effective way to foster
it was to permit foreign merchants into England. The reputation of
England’s openness would be reported abroad and encourage
reciprocation. At least since the middle ages, a kingdom could obtain
reciprocal treatment for merchants in a treaty.40 Coke suggested that
a nation could achieve that treatment even without a formal
agreement by unilaterally lowering trade barriers. For Coke, the
merchants’ chapter did not reflect an interest-group struggle between
barons seeking foreign luxury goods and jealous domestic merchants
who wanted all trade to themselves.41 Instead, he assumed that there
could be gains from trade on both sides. He also recognized that
foreign merchants did not just sell; they also bought English goods,
leaving specie payment behind and benefiting England’s balance of
38. This was one of Coke’s signature terms. See, e.g., 3 COMMONS DEBATES 1628, at
167 (Robert C. Johnson et al. eds., 1977) (Coke reporting from a “committee appointed to
frame a bill concerning the liberty of the subject”).
39. See, e.g., COKE, supra note 1, ch. 1, at *3 (“[T]his charter is declaratory of the
ancient law and liberty of England, and therefore no new freedom is hereby
granted . . . but a restitution of such as lawfully they had before, and to free them of that
which had been usurped and incroached upon them by any power whatsoever . . . .”); id.
ch. 2, at *8 (“Lastly, this chapter of Magna Charta is but a restitution and declaration of
the ancient common law . . . .”).
40. See W.S. Culbertson, Commercial Treaties, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 24, 25 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., MacMillan Co., 1931).
41. This schematic interest-group interpretation, common a century ago, ignores the
need of English merchants to interact with foreign merchants in order to gain access to
their goods and export markets. Coke had not made that mistake. There was, however,
probably some tension between wholesale merchants and local retailers, which is reflected
in Magna Carta’s protection of local mercantile privileges, such as London’s “old
liberties.” MAGNA CARTA ch. 13, reprinted and translated in SELECT HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES, supra note 1, at 135, 139.
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payments (or at least counterbalancing domestic payments to foreign
producers).42
Coke did not elaborate his reasoning, but what he did write does
not fit comfortably into the categories of mercantilism or liberalism.
He was committed to benefiting England’s internal economy, while
also recognizing that foreign merchants would follow both their
individual interests and their nations’ interests as well. All those
interests aligned for some purposes. A wise legal system would foster
mutual gain. For Coke, the medieval charter provided one mechanism
for promoting that ideal political economy. He was groping toward
freer if not absolutely free trade, and he argued that legal liberties
within England, even for aliens, could benefit Englishmen at home
and abroad. Commercial rights had a diplomatic dimension. Coke was
of course not himself part of the Enlightenment, the beginnings of
which historians trace later in the seventeenth century. Here as
elsewhere, though, he was groping toward new uses of old law. For
him, the barons’ resistance to King John fit nicely with his and other
Parliamentarians’ resistance to the Stuart Kings’ claims of power.
Others might take this resistance out of context, and perhaps even
deploy it against representative legislatures.
There were answers to this reasoning. Some of Coke’s
contemporaries were more skeptical of erasing the conceptual
boundary between public and private interests. In the eyes of the
Stuart Kings’ defenders, the realm had common interests that were of
a different sort altogether from the petty interests of individual
subjects. At about the same time that Coke equated commerce with
national welfare, Chief Baron Sir Thomas Fleming rebutted the
(admittedly different) claim that merchants ought to have
unrestricted access to foreign markets by stating that “the end of
every private merchant is not the common good, but his particular
profit.”43 In contrast, King James’s prerogative taxes, designed to
obstruct some foreign trade, furthered the public welfare. On this
account, the private interests of merchants should give way to salus
populi.44 And it was the king-in-council who was best positioned to
gauge the common good. Trade regulation was a political matter,
42. COKE, supra note 1, ch. 30.
43. Bates’s Case (1606) 145 Eng. Rep. 267, 272 (Exchequer) (upholding royal, rather
than parliamentary, impositions on foreign trade). On the constitutional theory beneath
this prerogative claim, see W. S. Holdsworth, The Prerogative in the Sixteenth Century, 21
COLUM. L. REV. 554, 559–60 (1921); see also GLENN BURGESS, THE POLITICS OF THE
ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1603–
1642, at 140–41 (1992).
44. Bates’s Case, 145 Eng. Rep. at 271.
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centered in the king’s court rather than fragmented in the mercantile
community or in Parliament. The contrast between and the conflation
of mercantile interest and public welfare both circulated in Englishspeaking political culture at least since the Stuart period. Coke’s
conception was not alone in crossing the Atlantic. But it was strongly
stated and influential. Its influence derived in no small part from the
fact that it comported with many Americans’ own views of the
centrality of international commerce to the survival of the newly
independent United States.
B.

The Merchants’ Chapter in the Enlightenment: Montesquieu

Despite the reservations of other English lawyers, Coke’s
treatment became the proximate source for Magna Carta and its
meaning for over a century afterward. That was true especially
outside the British Empire. Montesquieu, for example, had evidently
read Coke’s gloss on Magna Carta before drafting Spirit of the Laws
in 1748. A significant part of that book celebrates the English
Constitution. One example is the Frenchman’s recapitulation of
Coke’s version of the merchants’ chapter: “The Magna Charta of
England forbids the seizing and confiscating, in case of war, the
effects of foreign merchants, except by way of reprisals,”
Montesquieu wrote.45 “It is an honor to the English nation that they
have made this one of the articles of their liberty.”46 The paean came
in the part of the book that famously celebrates doux commerce.
Commerce not only diffuses wealth, he argued; it also destroys
prejudice, softens manners, diffuses learning, and promotes peaceful
international relations because it makes nations mutually and
consciously interdependent.47 “Peace,” he declared, “is the natural
effect of trade.”48 Here Montesquieu moved beyond Coke’s
45. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, bk. XX, § 14, at 324 (Thomas
Nugent trans., Colonial Press 1900) (1748). Montesquieu’s spelling of Magna Charta, with
an “h”, suggests the influence of Coke’s treatment of the charter. Coke helped partially
Anglicize the spelling, and throughout most of the eighteenth century “Charta” was the
preferred spelling. William Blackstone appears to have begun the reversion to “Carta” in
his 1759 treatise: WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE GREAT CHARTER AND CHARTER OF THE
FOREST, WITH OTHER AUTHENTIC INSTRUMENTS: TO WHICH IS PREFIXED AN
INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSE ON THE HISTORY OF THE CHARTERS, at xxix (Oxford,
Claredon Press 1759).
46. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 45, bk. XX, § 14, at 324.
47. Id. bk. XX, § 2, at 316–17.
48. Id. bk. XX, § 2, at 316. Montesquieu contrasted Spanish laws penalizing trading
with the British enemy in the War over the Asiento (also known as the War of Jenkins’
Ear). Spain had imposed the death penalty on its merchants who traded with Britain. This
was uncivilized:
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calculated and functional reciprocity and posited a utopian human
sociability. Commerce does not just strengthen individual nations. It
brings nations together.
The English had taken the lead. “Other nations have made the
interests of commerce yield to those of politics,” Montesquieu went
on to observe, “the English, on the contrary, have ever made their
political interests give way to those of commerce.”49 Commerce was
beneficial, and politics should not frustrate it in favor of corrupt, local
gain. Therefore, commerce should be partially insulated from politics.
Yet he also warned that a state should never permit unfettered trade,
which would lead to “slavery.”50 Montesquieu characterized the
difference between the healthy and detrimental commerce by
contrasting what he called “economical commerce,” in which
merchants incessantly pursued small gains, to “commerce of luxury,”
in which merchants speculated for quick fortunes.51 An economy
relying on slavery was his example of luxury commerce. A country
with slavery had fewer commercial restrictions than a free one, but a
slave-based economy was, in Montesquieu’s view, not the most
productive.52 The contrast between Britain’s pro-commercial
regulation of commerce and a slave society’s anti-commercial
protection of unfettered trade in human beings epitomized for
Montesquieu the difference between governments that favor
economical commerce and those that foster unhealthy luxury
commerce. Slave-based economies sacrificed long-term commercial
health for short-term gains. Some restrictions on commercial greed

An ordinance like this cannot . . . find a precedent in any laws but those of Japan.
[He criticized Japan and China for tightly controlling foreign trade.] It equally
shocks humanity, the spirit of commerce, and the harmony which ought to subsist
in the proportion of penalties; it confounds all our ideas, making that a crime
against the state which is only a violation of civil polity.
Id. bk. XX, § 14, at 324. Montesquieu seems to have believed that Britain did not
criminalize trading with the enemy, because, after all, the British let enemy merchants
remain among them without confiscation. This did not at all follow. He was not aware that
Britain had its own laws penalizing trade with the enemy, as well as a much-abused
licensing system for avoiding them. See generally Su Jin Kim & James Oldham, Insuring
Maritime Trade with the Enemy in the Napoleonic Era, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 561 (2012)
(discussing Parliamentary statutes prohibiting trade with France and the issuance of
licenses intended to protect the British economy).
49. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 45, bk. XX, § 7, at 321.
50. Id. bk. XX, § 12, at 323.
51. Id. bk. XX, § 4, at 318–19. The latter, he thought, was a species of gambling. Id.
52. See id. bk. XV, § 8, at 240–41.
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and exploitation redounded, in the long run, in favor of commerce.53
Observing the example of the British Navigation Acts, which forbade
foreign nations to trade directly with British colonies, Montesquieu
reasoned, “[t]he English constrain the merchant, but it is in favor of
commerce.”54
What Montesquieu meant when he contrasted commerce and
politics, while retaining space for regulation, is not entirely clear. He
was famously epigrammatic and analytically pluralist, if not
inconsistent.55 Commerce could be a force for peace, if well regulated;
governments should not, however, frustrate commerce; and a wellbalanced constitution would tend to produce the right sort of
“moderate government.”56 On balance, though, Montesquieu argued
that politics were national, jealous, and tended toward belligerence.
Commerce, on the other hand, was international, cosmopolitan, and
promoted peace. A mixed constitution would produce the right
balance between policy and commerce. It was a naïve view even by
eighteenth-century standards. Istvan Hont demonstrated that there
were debates among Enlightenment thinkers about whether and to
what degree commerce promoted peace, as well as about the quality
of peace it created. Some writers compared international-trade
competition to an unstable equilibrium akin to commercial quasiwar.57 And Montesquieu himself stressed the complex preconditions
necessary before nations would be able to come together in
commercially based confederations.58 Nonetheless Montesquieu
broadcast optimistic views of the English Constitution and the
relationship between international commerce and world peace.
He also drew two distinctions that became increasingly
influential as the eighteenth century moved toward the nineteenth.
First, he suggested that there was or should be some kind of
53. Economical commerce was based on “reciprocity and competitive advantage,”
while luxury commerce served “the fantastic consumption demands of a small ruling
class.” Robert Howse, Montesquieu on Commerce, Conquest, War, and Peace, 31 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 693, 702 (2006).
54. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 45, bk. XX, § 12, at 323.
55. Cf. Howse, supra note 53, at 708 (arguing that readers “should not project onto his
sober spirit the actual project of world government or a universal liberal society. But,
without some such conception, his contentions about the relationship of commerce, war
and peace collapse into a set of contradictions, paradoxes and tautologies”).
56. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 45, bk. XI, § 20, at 182.
57. HONT, supra note 10, at 186–87.
58. Howse, supra note 53, at 698 (noting that Montesquieu observes that there are “a
diversity of laws, both over time and among different political communities at a given
time, which would at face value make any project depending on legal harmonization or
integration seem utterly unrealistic”).
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separation between commerce and ordinary politics.59 Second, he
divided politics into constitutions, on the one hand, and daily
governance, on the other.60 Montesquieu also connected these
distinctions to the English Constitution.61 Embedding commercial
welfare in fundamental law, along with the exclusion of some
dimensions of commerce from the ken of ordinary legislators, was a
plausible inference. In other words, the ancient idea of fundamental
law carried into the Enlightenment on the back of theory that tended
to insulate healthy “economical commerce” from rent-seeking
politics. It would not take much to start packing economic liberties
into constitutional forms. As lawyers attempted to do so, the
merchants’ chapter remained alive.
C.

Proximate Authority: Blackstone’s Gloss on Magna Carta and
Montesquieu

When William Blackstone glossed Magna Carta in his
Commentaries on the Laws of England two decades later, he invoked
both Coke and Montesquieu.62 Magna Carta “gave new
encouragements to commerce, by the protection of merchant
strangers,” he noted in his spirited celebration of English legal history
at the end of the Commentaries.63 “Indeed, the law of England, as a
commercial country, pays a very particular regard to foreign
merchants in innumerable instances.”64 He enjoyed noting
Montesquieu’s celebration of the merchants’ chapter65 and then
flaunted his own learning, and demystified the merchants’ chapter, or
at least Coke’s exceptionalist version of it, by observing that the
reciprocal treatment of resident merchants during wartime
seems to have been a common rule of equity among all the
northern nations; for we learn from Stiernhook, that it was a
maxim among the Goths and Swedes, “quam legem exteri nobis

59. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 45, bk. XX, § 7, at 321.
60. See id. bk. XX, § 11, at 323; § 18, at 325–26.
61. Montesquieu may have derived this distinction between the constitution and
government as separations in government power from Bolingbroke. See Robert Shackleton,
Montesquieu, Bolingbroke, and the Separation of Powers, 3 FRENCH STUD. 25, 37 (1949)
(“Montesquieu’s general attitude to England was coloured by Bolingbroke’s views.”). For
Bolingbroke’s distinction between constitutions and government, see DANIEL J.
HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664–1830, at 37–38 (2005).
62. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *260–62.
63. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425.
64. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *260.
65. Id.
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posuere, eandem illis ponemus.” [The same law that foreign
powers have shown us, we should observe to them.]66
That appeared to be a local rule of interstate comity, much like the
guarantees that modern nations could obtain through treaties. In sum,
the notion of reciprocal treatment of foreign merchants in wartime
had long circulated in the European world before Magna Carta. The
barons and King John had not invented it.
However, Blackstone drove home the point that it was one thing
for a nation to pledge commercial reciprocity in treaties with trading
partners and another to promise it gratuitously and unilaterally in a
constitutional document. “[I]t is somewhat extraordinary, that it,”
meaning the principle of wartime reciprocity, “should have found a
place in magna carta, a mere interior treaty between the king and his
natural-born subjects.”67 The sociability of the English Constitution
was yet additional proof of its uniqueness. And the principle was
more Teutonic than Roman: it derived from northern European
practice rather than the ius commune. Indeed the Romans,
Blackstone claimed, had a very different approach to commerce.
They,
in their manners, their constitution, and even in their laws,
treated commerce as a dishonorable employment, and
prohibited the exercise thereof to persons of birth, or rank, or
fortune: and equally different from the bigotry of the canonists,
who looked on trade as inconsistent with christianity, and
determined at the council of Melfi, under Pope Urban II, A.D.
1090, that it was impossible with a safe conscience to exercise
any traffic, or follow the profession of the law.68
For Blackstone, the English embrace of commerce marked a salutary
divergence from the two major (and related) continental legal
traditions: Roman and canon law. Yet all of Europe was the
beneficiary.
For Montesquieu and Blackstone, the merchants’ chapter
reflected the commercial progress that had helped move European
civilization out of a barbarous age. The medieval guarantee promised
66. Id. (internal citations omitted). Johann Stiernhook was a Swedish legal writer in
the seventeenth century who wrote as an institutionalist in the continental tradition, a
tradition to which Blackstone tried to conform. See generally John W. Cairns, Blackstone,
an English Institutist: Legal Literature and the Rise of the Nation State, 4 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 318 (1984) (discussing how Blackstone’s Commentaries reflected trends in
the continental tradition).
67. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *260.
68. Id. at *261 (internal citations omitted).
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in the charter between the barons and King John was transformed
into something larger by Enlightenment legal thinkers struggling to
work out the complex relationship between commerce and
international relations. None of these writers documented how, or
even whether, the merchants’ chapter played a pivotal role in specific
controversies, or whether it had autonomous force as a motive for
official action in any real situation. These writings were
jurisprudential, or didactic and moral exercises, rather than concrete
legal or especially historical investigations. As such, they all circulated
freely in early America.69
The story of the merchants’ chapter of Magna Carta in the
Enlightenment was not, however, just about moral philosophy,
jurisprudence, and theory. Constitution-makers in the late eighteenth
century debated many interesting jurisprudential and moral concepts.
At the same time, they also built legal institutions that had significant
consequences for real people. Putting aside the question of whether
the merchants’ chapter or its early modern gloss in the form of the
general reciprocity principle ever had motivating force in English
international affairs, elsewhere it did play at least a supporting role in
vigorous debates over the degree to which a new, post-colonial
society should be open to foreigners and their money.
III. FOREIGN MERCHANTS AND REVOLUTIONARY COMMERCE
A contagion of constitution-making spread across the Atlantic
world for two generations after the American Revolution.70 At the
same time, commerce also continued to expand across the Atlantic
world and beyond. Almost everywhere, constitution-makers—
drafters, ratifiers, readers, and implementers—grappled with the

69. On the circulation of Coke’s Institutes in the early United States, see James Haw,
John Rutledge: Distinction and Declension, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE
JOHN MARSHALL 70, 82 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998) (quoting John Rutledge’s claim
that Coke’s Institutes were “almost the foundation of our law”). On Montesquieu’s
readership in early America, see PAUL MERRILL SPURLIN, MONTESQUIEU IN AMERICA
1760–1801 (1940). On the circulation of Blackstone’s Commentaries, see Paul D.
Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 527 (1990) (discussing the influence of Montesquieu and Blackstone’s works in early
American legal education); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New
American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731 (1976)
(discussing Blackstone’s impact on American politics, courts, and legal education).
70. For the explosion of constitution-writing after the American Revolution, see
Linda Colley, Empires of Writing: Britain, America and Constitutions, 1776–1848, 32 LAW
& HIST. REV. 237 (2014). For the similar rise in declarations of independence after the
American Revolution, see David Armitage, The Contagion of Sovereignty: Declarations of
Independence Since 1776, 52 S. AFR. HIST. J. 1 (2005).
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problem of foreign trade and capital and how, or to what degree,
constitutions ought to structure and protect foreign commerce. Some
of those constitution-makers sought to open their economies from the
foundation up; others were more skeptical. But almost everywhere,
issues concerning foreign trade and foreign capital were on
constitution-makers’ agendas.
In the early United States especially, access to and regulation of
foreign trade and capital were salient issues in the ratification debates
over federal legislative power, the treaty power, and the federal
courts. Pre-war debts were on many minds, and so was the need for
increased trade and capital to shore up the finances of the new
nation.71 Such problems also motivated Antifederalists to demand, in
the Bill of Rights, the guarantee of a jury in civil cases: a jury of native
peers who would not only protect individual debtors but also pluralist
sources of law.72 Domestic and diplomatic controversies concerning
foreign trade and investment remained salient in the 1790s, as Europe
broke into continent-wide wars over the French Revolution.
Throughout the federal government, in the courts as well as in the
political branches, the problems of foreign credit—whether to attract
it, where to seek it, what to do with it, and how to control it—shaped
the ways that the founding generation began to interpret the new
Constitution and construct the federal government.
A. Judicial Interpretation of Creditors’ Rights: The Brailsford Case
The ink was barely dry on the ratified Federal Constitution when
proto-partisan debate began over how it applied to international
commerce and finance. The Brailsford case became one of the earliest
cases argued in the new Supreme Court, only the fourth to reach
judgment, and the first (and one of only a few) to culminate in a jury
trial in the Court itself.73 Again, the case began when the British
71. See ROGER H. BROWN, REDEEMING THE REPUBLIC: FEDERALISTS, TAXATION,
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 11–21 (1993); MAX M. EDLING, A
REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT 149–90 (2003); E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE
POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, 1776–1790, at 179–
219, 289–305 (1961).
72. On the jury as a pluralist source of law, see WILLIAM E. NELSON,
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 96–97 (1975); SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE
JOHN MARSHALL 5–6, 48–49 (1990).
73. See 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 73. The Supreme Court rendered three decisions in
the case over two years; the third and final judgment is here counted as the fourth
judgment in the Court’s history. The Court entered two default judgments in other cases
that would have gone to trial had the state defendants appeared: Oswald v. New York,
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creditor sued his Georgia debtor in federal circuit court for a pre-war
debt.74 Georgia moved to interplead because, it claimed, it had
confiscated the debt during the Revolution and feared that the
defendant would not adequately protect the State’s ownership
interest.75
The merchants’ chapter did not fit the case well. The dispute
involved debts, rather than merchandise, owed to some merchants,
like Brailsford, who were outside Georgia and even North America
during the war. A chapter written for medieval resident merchants
trading goods was refitted onto early modern transatlantic credit
networks. Before the Revolution, agents of English and Scottish
creditors could sue freely in colonial courts to collect debts, or sue
against the person, property, or guarantor of colonial debtors located
in Britain.76 In the 1780s, these foreign agents had limited recourse to
the state courts, several of which were inhospitable to debt collection
suits either because of statutory obstructions, judicial rulings, or jury
nullification.77 But now the Judiciary Act of 1789 allowed them to sue
in the new federal courts, with the rule of decision coming from either
state law or, when applicable, federal law, treaties, or the

Minutes of the Supreme Court, Feb. 5, 1795 (unreported) and Cutting v. South Carolina,
Minutes of the Supreme Court, Aug. 8, 1797 (unreported). See 5 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1800, at 62, 458–59
(Maeva Marcus et al. eds., Columbia Univ. Press 1994) [hereinafter 5 DHSC].
74. The federal circuit courts had
original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of
a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds
[$500], and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or
the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of
another State.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. The $500 minimum amount in
controversy requirement was a significant bar to suits for modest debts.
75. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
76. This right to sue in any court in the British Empire that had subject matter and
personal jurisdiction over the matter flowed from another imperial reciprocity principle,
the one that gave subjects equal access to all the King’s courts, in any dominion. See
Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding Empire: Sir Edward
Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 456 (2003).
77. Virginia, for example, passed statutes forbidding British creditors from suing in its
courts until Britain met its obligations under the Treaty of Peace. See, e.g., An Act to
Repeal So Much of All or Every Act or Acts of Assembly as Prohibits the Recovery of
British Debts, in 12 GEORGE COCHRAN, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 528, 528 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823)
(passed Dec. 12, 1787) (purporting to repeal disability on suits by British creditors but
suspending the Act until Britain complied with Article VII by returning or paying
compensation for slaves).
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Constitution.78 This was just one example of a prominent theme in
early American legal history: as imperial relationships became
international, Federalist reformers reconfigured colonial legal and
commercial practices into new federal institutions.79
In the Brailsford case, the circuit court judges, Justice James
Iredell and Judge Nathaniel Pendleton, both invoked the reciprocity
principle of the merchants’ chapter to help find that Georgia had not
confiscated the old debt.80 The judges parsed Georgia’s statute to find
that its drafters had distinguished debts owed to British merchants
residing in Britain from those owed to British subjects in Georgia.81
This was a plausible reading of awkward statutory language.82
Because Brailsford had resided in Britain throughout the war, the
Circuit Court concluded that the legislature had only sequestered, but
not confiscated, the debt owed to him.83
The statute did not clarify why the legislature drew this
distinction. Judge Pendleton supposed that that legislature might have
distinguished creditors abroad for a number of reasons. One was the
sense that many merchants in Britain opposed the war against their
American trading partners.84 Another was that the legislators passing
the 1782 statute foresaw that creditor rights would be central to the
peace treaty and wished to set them aside from confiscation.85 In
addition, the legislators might have been influenced by the general
principle that “debts contracted on the faith of commercial
intercourse ought to be deemed of a sacred and inviolable nature.”86
Elaborating the last supposition, Pendleton reminded his American
audience how debt between colonists and metropolitan merchants

78. For the purpose of alienage jurisdiction, see Tarter & Holt, supra note 7, at 259.
79. See HULSEBOSCH, supra note 61, at 203–58.
80. Iredell’s opinion credits one of Brailsford’s attorneys in the Circuit Court
proceeding for introducing the chapter during oral argument. James Iredell’s Circuit Court
Opinion, supra note 15, at 105.
81. See id. at 104–05.
82. See, e.g., id. Section five of the Georgia statute provided that debts owed to
“merchants and others residing in Great Britain should be sequestered” rather than
confiscated, though it did not define sequestration. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 96. The next
section confiscated the real and personal property of British subjects, except that owed to
merchants in Britain, which instead was to be sequestered. Id. at 93, 96.
83. James Iredell’s Circuit Court Opinion, supra note 15, at 112. The judges also
analyzed the legal difference between sequestration, which was akin to holding property in
trust for the creditor-beneficiary, and confiscation, which transferred title to the State. 6
DHSC, supra note 2, at 98–99.
84. Id. at 96.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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had facilitated imperial trade.87 It could do so again—outside the
Empire. Interpreting the statute as merely sequestering these debts
would promote reconciliation and a resumption of that trade. That,
too, he supposed, might have been in the minds of Georgia’s wartime
legislators. It was at this point that Pendleton invoked the second part
of the merchants’ chapter, whereby in wartime “the merchants of the
inimical country shall be attached, without injury to their persons or
goods,” until it was known how the enemy was treating English
merchants in its country.88 “Perhaps,” concluded Pendleton, “this wise
and equitable provision in favor of commerce might have suggested
to the framers of the Confiscation Act the idea of this distinction.”89
Supreme Court Justice Iredell, then riding circuit in the southern
states, likewise invoked the merchants’ chapter to “illustrat[e]” the
legal distinction between confiscation and sequestration.90 He also
invoked Montesquieu’s “high eulogium” of the merchants’ chapter to
help explain why “every one must admit” the reasonableness of
distinguishing between resident Loyalists, who “basely betrayed their
Country,” and British creditors abroad, who played no role in the war
and even “used the greatest efforts to prevent it.”91 Then Iredell
addressed the law of nations. The traditional allowance under the
laws of war for belligerent powers to confiscate enemy property, even
debts, was something like a trump card for the debtor and Georgia.
Iredell admitted that the customary law of nations did not prohibit a
nation at war from confiscating the debt owed to subjects of its
enemy.92 Yet the “modern practice in Europe” was not to confiscate
debts in wartime, and Britain respected that practice during the
Revolution: it had not confiscated American debts.93 The law of
nations was becoming more liberal, these Federalist judges argued,
though only beginning to catch up with the protection guaranteed in
Magna Carta.
87. Id. at 100 (supposing that the treaty-makers considered the debts owed to real
British subjects to have been “contracted on the faith of commercial credit” and thus
inviolable).
88. Id. at 97 (“Magna Charta, a law well known in America, declares, that, in case of a
war, the merchants of the inimical country shall be attached, without injury to their
persons or goods, till it is known in what manner English merchants are treated in that
country.”).
89. Id.
90. James Iredell’s Circuit Court Opinion, supra note 15, at 105.
91. Id. at 106. Iredell elided the distinction between Loyalists who had not made
themselves “Citizens” of Georgia and other British subjects who had not. Id.
92. Id. at 105–06.
93. Id. at 106. Of course there were few debts owed to Americans by Britons to
confiscate in the first place.
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Because both Pendleton and Iredell admitted that the law of
nations traditionally permitted belligerent states to confiscate debts, it
was crucial for them, as it had been for Brailsford’s attorneys, to
argue that the State had not confiscated debts. A holding that
Georgia had not confiscated Brailsford’s debt would avoid the more
difficult question of whether it had the power to do so and, if so,
whether the Treaty of Peace nullified that forfeiture.94 Here is where
the merchants’ chapter did real work. The chapter, along with the
liberal trend in the law of nations of exempting debt from
confiscation, enabled Brailsford’s lawyers to contend that Georgia
had behaved liberally during the war, whether or not it possessed the
ultimate power to expropriate debts.
The Supreme Court agreed with the interpretation of the Circuit
Court below: Georgia had sequestered but not confiscated the debt.95
When peace returned, under the law of nations, a foreign creditor
could return to seek collection. The Treaty of Peace’s prohibition of
additional “impediments” further protected the creditor’s right to
obtain satisfaction. In the trial between Georgia and the creditor in
the Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Jay charged the jury
accordingly. Although newspapers reported that he told the jury that
it possessed the power to determine law as well as fact, he strongly
instructed the jury that the Justices unanimously agreed that Georgia
had not confiscated, but rather only sequestered, the debts owed to
Brailsford.96 Consequently, “his Right to recover them revived at the
peace bot[h by] the Law of Nations & the Treaty of peace.”97
94. Justice Iredell, rehearsing his dissent in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199
(1796), indicated that the Supremacy Clause could not be invoked to reverse state actions
taken before the Constitution’s ratification. James Iredell’s Circuit Court Opinion, supra
note 15, at 112–13.
95. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 77.
96. See Fragment of John Jay’s Charge to the Petit Jury, reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra
note 2, at 170, 170; DUNLAP’S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 17, 1794, as reprinted in 6
DHSC, supra note 2, at 171, 173 (reporting Jay’s jury charge).
97. Fragment of John Jay’s Charge to the Petit Jury, supra note 96, at 170. A
newspaper reported that Jay told the jury it could decide law as well as fact. See DUNLAP’S
AM. DAILY ADVERTISER, supra note 96, at 173. For a recent Note arguing that the case
involved the application of the law merchant as applied by a special jury of merchants, see
Lochlan F. Shelfer, Note, Special Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 YALE L.J. 208, 211
(2013). Although the lawyers and judges in Brailsford did analyze the laws of war and the
Treaty of Peace, they did not mention the law merchant, which concerned peacetime
commercial transactions rather than wartime confiscation of debt. In addition, the special
jury did not appear to bring expert wisdom to the case. Instead, after Chief Justice Jay
charged the jury with strong and clear statements of the Court’s view of the governing
legal rules, the jurors interrupted their deliberations to ask the Court to specify once again
the two major issues and the Court’s view of the relevant law on those issues—to Jay’s
annoyance. See DUNLAP’S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER, supra note 96, at 174. Jury selection
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Apparently that unvarnished instruction was not clear enough.
Later that day the jury submitted two questions to the Court. The first
asked whether sequestration “[v]est[ed] the State of Georgia
completely with the debts,” and the second asked, if sequestration
had vested title in Georgia, whether the treaty “or any other cause”
revived the creditor’s right to recover.98 Jay explained that his charge
had covered the ground of both questions already and repeated that
the Justices believed that Georgia’s statute had not vested title to the
debts in the state.99 As to the second and more difficult question, Jay
did not answer. Instead, he simply stated that “no sequestration
divests the property in the thing sequestered.”100 So instructed, the
jury found that Georgia had only sequestered and not confiscated
British debts. Brailsford had finally won.101
The extension and elaboration of the merchants’ chapter in the
Brailsford case cannot stand for the proposition that the federal
courts unequivocally protected the rights of foreign merchants, even
the subset of British merchants who enjoyed explicit protection in the
Treaty of Peace. At exactly the same time that the Supreme Court
decided that it would permit Georgia to interplead in the case against
Brailsford, it also held, in Chisholm v. Georgia,102 that the citizen of
another state—including a foreign citizen or subject—could sue a
state, here again the State of Georgia.103 In other words, the states did
not enjoy sovereign immunity and could be sued in the federal courts.

by a Federalist marshal probably had more to do with the jury’s judgment than the nature
of their employment as merchants (though the two characteristics probably overlapped).
On Federalist jury selection, see Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury
and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997 (2007); Tarter &
Holt, supra note 7. Moreover, historians are increasingly skeptical that the early modern
law merchant was actually a coherent body of law generated by merchants. See, e.g., Emily
Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1153–59 (2012).
98. Questions Proposed by the Petit Jury, reprinted in 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 171.
99. See 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 87.
100. DUNLAP’S AM. DAILY ADVERTISER, supra note 96, at 174.
101. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 5 (1794). Brailsford’s legal victory did not
mean he could easily collect the debt. He sought execution for several years and
eventually recovered only part of what he was owed. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 87–88.
102. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The Chisholm decision came down the same week as
the decision that the Court would hear the Brailsford case. 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 83
n.58.
103. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 431. Article III of the Federal Constitution provides
jurisdiction in the federal courts for suits “between a State and Citizens of another State,”
“foreign States,” or “[foreign] Citizens or Subjects,” and the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789
did not clarify this ambiguous formulation. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, §§ 11–13, 1 Stat. 73, 78–81.
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Chisholm led to grumbling among the states and proposals to
amend the Constitution to prevent at least some suits against states.104
Congress did not, however, muster a supermajority to send an
amendment to the states in the winter of 1793.105 Then, in February
1794, the jury returned a verdict for Brailsford in the Supreme Court,
and one week later the Court determined final damages in the
Chisholm case.106 It was one thing for a state to decide to sue in the
Supreme Court and risk loss, as in Brailsford. It was another for a
state to be sued in the Supreme Court as an involuntary defendant—
and lose. When Georgia lost to the British creditor in Brailsford on
the merits and one week later received the damages judgment in
Chisholm, complaints about involuntary suits against states in federal
court cascaded into constitutional reform to protect state sovereign
immunity.107 The reason was not just the sense of offended dignity. In
addition—and previously unknown in American constitutional
history—Chisholm involved the claim of a creditor of ambiguous
loyalty.108 “Nothing remains but to give the key to our treasury to the
Agents of the Refugees, Tories and men who were inimical to our
Revolution,” complained a Boston newspaper in the months between
Chisholm and the final Brailsford decision.109 Federal jurisdiction over
state wartime behavior would force states “to distribute the hard
money, now deposited in that office, to persons of this description.”110
The argument is not that Brailsford was the final straw. Instead, the
jury verdict in Brailsford and the damages determination in Chisholm
fitted with other cases filed against the states, not least a notorious
104. For an examination of the reaction to Chisholm, see generally James E. Pfander,
History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1269 (1998).
105. 5 DHSC, supra note 72, at 597.
106. See 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 83 n.58.
107. For the passage of the Eleventh Amendment, see 5 DHSC, supra note 72, at 596–
604.
108. The standard narrative of the facts in Chisholm is recited in 5 DHSC, supra note
72, at 127–28. Newly discovered sources complicate the conventional understanding of the
case’s origins. The Scottish merchant whose estate sued Georgia in the Chisholm case
traded with both the revolutionary states and Britain early in the Revolution; resided in
British-controlled Charleston after 1780, where he entered a partnership with other British
merchants; evacuated with the British military in late 1782 and left for British East
Florida; and applied for citizenship in South Carolina in 1783. The contract at issue in
Chisholm appears then to have been a composition for damages. Table of Events,
Trezevant v. Mortimer, In Chancery ([1840?]), S.C. Historical Soc’y (copy of manuscript
on file with author). Chisholm will be explored in another article explaining how
binational merchants navigated the imperial civil war and then integrated into the United
States.
109. Communications, INDEP. CHRON. (Boston), Sept. 16, 1793, at 3, col. 2.
110. Id.
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case brought by an exiled Loyalist to recover damages from
Massachusetts for goods confiscated from his mansion during the
war.111 When combined, these cases starkly displayed to the state
governments the potency of Supreme Court jurisdiction.112
In sum, Brailsford raised a substantial bar against finding that a
state had successfully confiscated at least some loyalist property, and
it came on the heels of Chisholm’s holding that individuals (including
foreigners such as British subjects) could sue the states for debts in
the Supreme Court. The combination terrified the states. States that
had confiscated loyalist and British property began to fear that their
targets would return from hiding, enter federal court, and reopen
cases that the states believed had been settled with finality years
earlier. Within a month after the Brailsford decision, Congress passed
the Eleventh Amendment to close the federal courts to suits against
states by any individuals, domestic or foreign, and the states ratified it
the next year.113 The upshot was that alien merchants and creditors
still had access to federal courts when suing U.S. citizens, which is
what they most wanted. However, they no longer had the option of
suing the states directly.
B.

Creditors’ Rights in the Political Branches in the 1790s

The degree of protection owed to foreign merchants and
creditors was not a matter only for the early federal courts. Congress
and the Executive grappled with it as well. In those branches, also, the
merchants’ chapter was a useful authority for Federalists who wished
to protect international capital from national politics.
The degree of protection due to foreign capital was a central
issue in the partisan debates that raged during the 1790s, and indeed
to the development of what some historians call the first party
system.114 Some American constitution-builders like Alexander
Hamilton began to conceptualize the field of commerce as a space
111. Vassall v. Massachusetts (U.S. 1793) is unreported, but case documents are
published in 5 DHSC, supra note 72, at 352–449.
112. Cf. John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1938 (describing the Eleventh Amendment as a
compromise and “diversionary” maneuver to stifle calls for a new constitutional
convention, while preserving federal court jurisdiction over treaty-based cases arising from
state courts).
113. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Whether the amendment prohibited all suits,
including those arising under federal law, treaties, and the Constitution, or only those
based on diversity jurisdiction, has been much mooted. See, e.g., Pfander, supra note 104,
at 1352–56 (presenting both sides of the argument over the amendment’s meaning).
114. On the rise of the Jeffersonian Republicans, see STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 195–208 (1993).
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outside normal politics, a field structured by the high politics of
constitution-making and at least partly immune from the normal, low
politics of everyday governance.115 Directly or indirectly, Hamilton
was following ground that Montesquieu had mapped a generation
earlier.116 Others, like Thomas Jefferson, agreed that international
trade was central to the new nation and its constitutional structure.
However, they believed that the hydraulic pressure of international
reciprocity was now so intense and unavoidable that the United
States could compel foreign states to alter their trade and military
policies by threatening to cut off their commerce with the United
States. Economic sanctions, including penalties against foreign
merchants, became new, indeed revolutionary, diplomatic technology
for reducing the probability of war.
The same year that the Court decided Brailsford, the newly
organized Jeffersonian Republicans drove a package of economic
sanctions against Britain through Congress.117 After the outbreak of
the wars of the French Revolution, Britain began vacuuming up
neutral commerce on the high seas.118 Turning the reciprocity
principle almost on its head, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson
argued that nations trading in the Atlantic world were now so
interdependent, or at least so dependent on American trade, that
boycotts and embargoes would almost instantly force Britain to
respect U.S. grievances. “Peaceable coercion” was an alternative to
war. “I think it will furnish us a happy opportunity of setting another
precious example to the world,” Jefferson wrote to James Madison,
then serving as his point man in Congress, in March 1793, “by
shewing that nations may be brought to do justice by appeals to their
interests as well as by appeals to arms.”119 He then recommended that
Congress initiate trade embargoes with belligerent nations, a proposal
that would have gotten nowhere had he suggested it in President
Washington’s cabinet in the spring of 1793. “I should hope that
Congress instead of a denunciation of war,” Jefferson continued,
would instantly exclude from our ports all the manufactures,
produce, vessels and subjects of the nations committing this
115. This is a major theme in The Defence, essays published in 1795–1796 to defend the
Jay Treaty against Republican criticisms in Congress. See infra notes 133–49 and
accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 123–27 and accompanying text.
118. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 114, at 303–449.
119. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 24, 1793) (on file with the
Library of Congress), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-25-02-0408
#normal_view [http://perma.cc/EQT8-27EH].
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aggression, during the continuance of the aggression and till full
satisfaction made for it. This would work well in many ways,
safely in all, and introduce between nations another umpire
than arms. It would relieve us too from the risks and the
horrors of cutting throats.120
Jefferson had identified the perennial criticism of international
law: there was no “umpire” between nations when problems reached
the break point. There was only war. To him, as to many Republicans,
the increasing economic interdependence among nations offered the
possibility of a new kind of weapon, socially wounding but not
bloody. They now saw reciprocity not as an ideal or goal, but instead
as an economic fact. It was an economic mechanism for preserving
the old Enlightenment ideal of the balance of power.121 Even if
nations were not actually balanced when measured by political or
economic power, they were nonetheless mechanically balanced by
virtue of their need for each other’s trade. Jefferson was convinced
that the large European trading nations were especially dependent on
American commerce because the United States provided crucial
produce and a necessary market for finished goods.122 Doux
commerce was now an unbreakable addiction.
Congress did enact a short-term embargo on trade a year later, in
1794, amidst uncertainty about Britain’s intentions towards the
United States as it swept up much neutral commerce in the
Carribean.123 Some congressmen proposed going farther and
proposed a complete ban on commerce with Britain and the
sequestration of debt, including government issued debt in the form
of Treasury bills.124 The British were becoming large holders of such
debt, gradually supplanting Dutch investors as the largest group of
creditors of the federal government.125 Congress did not adopt this
form of economic sanction, but the idea got a lot of play126—just as

120. Id. For background on Jefferson’s and Madison’s commitment to economic
sanctions as tools of international diplomacy, see generally Drew R. McCoy, The Virginia
Port Bill of 1784, 83 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 288 (1975); Merrill D. Peterson,
Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783–1793, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 584 (1965).
121. Today the balance of power has a realist connotation; in the eighteenth century,
however, it was an aspirational alternative to “universal monarchy.” See MICHAEL
SHEEHAN, THE BALANCE OF POWER: HISTORY AND THEORY 97–120 (1996).
122. See Peterson, supra note 120, at 591–95.
123. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 114, at 390–95.
124. Id. at 392.
125. MIRA WILKINS, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES TO 1914, at 34–36 (1989).
126. See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 114, at 392, 394.
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the federal courts repeatedly handed down decisions forcing
Americans to repay decades-old debts to British creditors.127
Hamilton was aghast at these proposals, and not only because
they threatened his financial program, which depended heavily on
foreign trade and foreign investment in Treasury bonds.128 Indeed,
most Federalists opposed the provocative Republican policy of
peaceable coercion and, especially, the prospect of including the
suspension of public debt obligations in the arsenal.129 In the fall of
1794, President Washington sent Supreme Court Chief Justice Jay to
London to negotiate a treaty with Britain to resolve American
grievances arising from captures of neutral shipping in the French
wars and those stemming from the Revolution and the Treaty of
Peace, including the obstacles British creditors like Brailsford faced
when trying to collect old debts and also Britain’s retention of several
western forts within U.S. territory.130 Apparently on Jay’s initiative,
the resultant Jay Treaty also included a provision by which both sides
promised never to confiscate private or public debt obligations in
wartime, thereby committing the United States not to include
Treasury bills or shares of the Bank of the United States in the
repertoire of economic sanctions.131 Because treaties were the law of
the land, and it was not yet clear whether Congress could simply
supersede treaty pledges with ordinary legislation,132 the Jay Treaty
provision effectively stymied Jeffersonian attempts to employ
127. The federal courts were then hearing cases in which it was fairly clear that a state,
Jefferson’s own Virginia, had successfully appropriated the debt, thus raising the very
question that the federal judges and the Supreme Court had dodged in Brailsford by
relying on the merchants’ chapter. Hobson, supra note 7, at 187–88. Those cases
culminated in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 234–36 (1796) (holding that a British
creditor could sue an American debtor even if that debtor had paid the debt to the state
under a revolutionary sequestration statute).
128. See EDLING, supra note 71, at 208. Through the nineteenth century, foreign
creditors owned a majority of the federal debt. See JAY SEXTON, DEBTOR DIPLOMACY:
FINANCE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA, 1837–1873, at
10 fig.1 (2005); WILKINS, supra note 125, at 90, 54 tbl.3.2. For Hamilton’s financial
program, see generally EDLING, supra note 71, at 206–18; FERGUSON, supra note 71, at
292–96.
129. See Peterson, supra note 120, at 586–87.
130. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 114, at 397.
131. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (Jay Treaty), Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. X,
Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116, 122; see also Letter from John Jay to Edmund Randolph (Nov.
19, 1794), reprinted in THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 137,
141 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1893) (explaining Article X and reporting that Britons
“wishing to invest their property in our funds and banks, have frequently applied to me to
be informed whether they might do it without risk of confiscation or sequestration”).
132. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations
of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1157 (2000).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2016)

1630

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

economic sanctions against British creditors of the federal
government.
Explaining the wisdom of this guarantee to the public, Hamilton
gazed back longingly on the merchants’ chapter of Magna Carta, or,
more accurately, at its Enlightenment gloss, and lamented that he and
the other constitution-makers had only implicitly, and incompletely,
accomplished what the barons and King John had done so well. “How
much is it to be regretted, that our Magna Charta is not unequivocally
decorated with a like feature,” Hamilton noted wistfully about the
absence of an explicit provision protecting foreign debt from
confiscation.133 “[I]n this instance,” he continued, “we who have given
so many splendid examples to mankind are excelled in constitutional
precaution for the maintenance of Justice.”134 He then cobbled
together some clauses from the Federal Constitution to fashion a
substitute for the missing merchants’ chapter. His central claim was
that the spirit of the Contract Clause,135 which by its letter only
prohibited the states from interfering with the obligation of contracts,
restrained the federal government as well. In addition, it applied to
the government’s own contractual promises, another controversial
claim at the time.136 Consequently, Congress could not confiscate
foreign-held Treasury bonds.137
Perhaps because of the weakness of this doctrine of implied
constitutional limitation, or simply to plead in the alternative,
Hamilton also countered the argument that the law of nations
empowered states to confiscate debts. In another of his thirty-eight
public letters defending the Jay Treaty, and as Justice Iredell and
Judge Pendleton had done during the Brailsford litigation,138
Hamilton emphasized the modern, pro-creditor trend in the

133. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Defence No. XVIII (Oct. 6, 1795), in 19 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 299, 302 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973) (bold added).
134. Id.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
136. HAMILTON, supra note 133, at 302. Whether the Contract Clause applied to a
state’s own contracts was unclear in the first decade or so after the Constitution was
ratified. The Supreme Court held that it did in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139
(1810). It followed an interpretation Hamilton had offered as counsel in the case years
earlier. See Alexander Hamilton, Draft Case and Draft Answer, by Hamilton for William
Constable (Mar. 1796), in 4 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 428, 428–31 (Julius Goebel Jr. & Joseph H. Smith eds.,
1980).
137. HAMILTON, supra note 133, at 304–05.
138. A decade later, Pendleton was Hamilton’s second in his fateful duel with Aaron
Burr.
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customary law of nations.139 The latest authorities, notably Emer de
Vattel, embraced the principle that states should not confiscate
debts.140 On Hamilton’s reading, this principle was not just normative
but also positive: the modern customary law amounted to the
principle that belligerent powers could not confiscate debts. Hamilton
conceded that the United States had “a natural right of War in certain
cases to confiscate or sequester enemy’s property found within our
Country; but . . . on motives relative to Commerce and Public Credit,
the Customary Law of Europe has restrained that right as to private
debts and private property in public funds.”141 The main authority for
an unlimited right to confiscate derived from Roman law.142 As
Blackstone had in his gloss on the merchants’ chapter, Hamilton
expressed contempt for Roman public law. It was the same law, he
argued, that justified killing all enemies or simply enslaving them.143
Conquest, not trade, was the main Roman business; “for the most
part Commerce was little cultivated.”144 Fortunately, “moral science”
had undergone “improvement . . . in modern times.”145 Along with
that improvement came restraints on public authority, at least
respecting debts owed to foreigners. The modern customary law of
nations trumped the natural law of nations.
Hamilton’s attempt to read the protections of the merchants’
chapter into the Federal Constitution, along with his strong reading of
the law of nations,146 was designed to insulate international
commerce, or at least capital, from the hurly-burly of partisan
politics.147 Although he rejected Montesquieu’s utopian belief that
commerce automatically produced peace,148 Hamilton argued that the
139. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, To Defence No. XX (Oct. 23–24, 1795), in 19 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 133, at 329, 337–42.
140. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 453 (Béla Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2008) (1757).
141. HAMILTON, supra note 139, at 341.
142. Id. at 331–32.
143. Id. at 332–33.
144. Id. at 332.
145. Id. at 333.
146. Throughout he assumed that the law of nations was binding on the United States.
For the Federalist belief that the law of nations bound the United States, see generally
David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 932 (2010); Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as
Constitutional Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 729 (2012) (discussing how the Founders approached
the law of nations).
147. This is a major theme in The Defence.
148. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 6, at 19–20 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball
ed., 2003) (arguing that “the rivalships and competitions of commerce between
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partial insulation and deft management of commercial relations
would create gains for all sides involved in international trade.
Together, constitutional limitations and adroit diplomacy would
minimize the damage that political conflict between nations might
inflict on international commerce.149 The capital-starved United
States especially benefitted from such a system. Here, Hamilton
reformulated Coke’s realist sociability to fit the unusual financial
circumstances of a post-colonial and developing nation.
Post-revolutionary American legal arguments and political
debates took the centrality of international capital for granted.
Participants disagreed, however, about whether to insulate it with law
or make it a weapon of peace. In short, these disputes about the
relationship between fundamental law and commerce offer insight on
the constitutional arguments for capitalism as it began to triumph.150
Some of those arguments derived authority from a medieval provision
meant to protect commerce from royal prerogatives. Now that
tradition was reconfigured to restrain democratic legislation. If the
King could not do it, argued Federalists, neither should the people.
CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTING A FISCAL-COMMERCIAL STATE
The career of the merchants’ chapter of Magna Carta in the early
Republic demonstrates the enduring power of the medieval charter
almost six centuries after its drafting, even outside the British Empire.
It also reveals more. The resonance of the merchants’ chapter for
Federalists, especially, owed much more to its early modern gloss
than to King John and the barons at Runnymede. To Coke,
Montesquieu, and Blackstone, the chapter conveyed the wisdom and
utility of pledging a nation’s good faith to foreign traders. For them
all, the chapter illustrated fundamental principles of political
economy about the virtues of international reciprocity and the
benefits, all around, of (relatively) free commerce. Many
revolutionary Americans believed that gloss contained a lesson
especially important for a post-colonial and developing nation.
Pledging national faith in constitutional forms would send signals
commercial nations” can generate war). Hamilton was answering Antifederalist claims
that commerce would unite the states in a peaceful confederation, making a strong
national government unnecessary and possibly dangerous. See id. at 21–22. His position,
by contrast, was that although commerce between states was beneficial, it nonetheless
required careful management—as did all interstate and international relations. See id. at
24.
149. This is the gravamen of The Defence.
150. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 10 (analyzing the intellectual arguments that
facilitated the “triumph of capitalism”).
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abroad that foreign capital was safe from political manipulation in the
United States.151
This episode also sheds light on the broader international
dimensions of early American constitutionalism. The early American
constitutions, contrary to the exceptionalist myth of constitutionmaking, engaged the rest of the world.152 They were designed and
functioned to integrate the new states into a larger international
system, which the process of constitution-making presupposed. Given
the Enlightenment context for the outburst of revolutionary
constitution-making and the centrality in the Enlightenment of
questions of political economy—or the relation between political
structure and economic development in what contemporaries saw as
an international and even global economy153—it was inevitable that
constitution-makers and interpreters debated how to promote or
channel international commerce.
The Federal Constitution in particular is filled with provisions
designed to integrate the United States into the larger world of
European states, including many clauses that relate to international
trade and credit.154 It took away all foreign affairs powers from the
states and distributed many of them to Congress and the Executive;155
it disabled them from issuing paper money or interfering with future
contracts;156 it made the peace treaty and protection of existing
contracts the supreme law of the land;157 and it gave the federal courts
jurisdiction over cases involving aliens and foreign states.158

151. Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 85–86, 89–90
(2002) (modelling the signaling function of nations’ human rights protections for foreign
investors in the modern world); David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of
Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. L. REV. 1277, 1282 (2008) (modelling a “constitutional ‘race
to the top’ driven by competition among countries for capital and skilled migrants”).
152. Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 146, at 934; Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The
Revolutionary Portfolio: Constitution-Making and the Wider World in the American
Revolution, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 759, 761 (2014).
153. See HONT, supra note 10, at 99–111. See generally Steve Pincus, Rethinking
Mercantilism: Political Economy, the British Empire, and the Atlantic World in the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 69 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (2012) (outlining contest
between two competing views of commerce and political economy in late seventeenthcentury Britain).
154. Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Being Seen Like a State: The American Constitution and
Its International Audiences at the Founding 96–100 (Jan. 2012) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author). Max Edling focuses on the public finance dimensions of Hamilton’s
conception of the Constitution. See EDLING, supra note 71, at 207.
155. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10; id. art. II, § 2.
156. Id. art. I, § 10.
157. Id. art. VI.
158. Id. art. III, § 2.
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Amidst the construction of a legal environment hospitable to
foreign trade and investment, the merchants’ chapter played a
supporting role in the transformation of that text into constitutional
governance. In one of the many early cases involving the rights of
foreigners in America,159 federal judges invoked Magna Carta to
frame a debatable interpretation of a state statute and protect a
foreign stream of credit. Soon after, Alexander Hamilton invoked the
merchants’ chapter when formulating an aggressive interpretation of
the Contract Clause to apply it to governmental contracts, including
contracts made by the federal government. And although the
Jeffersonian Republicans did not agree that international capital
should be insulated from ordinary politics, they concurred with the
Federalist premise: the United States was deeply enmeshed in an
international economy, indeed inevitably so, and its future
development depended on the openness of that economy. This
solicitude for foreign trade and investment, and the belief that war
would stifle American development, casts doubt on the proposition
that American constitution-makers aspired to create a fiscal-military
state of the sort supposed to have emerged in early modern Europe.160
It is better characterized as a fiscal-commercial state.

159. For the dominance of cases involving aliens in the federal docket, see Ariel N.
Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical
Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855, 872–73 (2006); Kevin Arlyck,
Forged by War: The Federal Courts and Foreign Affairs in the Age of Revolution (Sept.
2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with author).
160. This is Edling’s argument, working off JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER:
WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 1688–1783 (1990), who in turn derived it from
Charles Tilly and his followers. CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL AND EUROPEAN
STATES, AD 990–1992 (1992). Steve Pincus challenges Brewer’s bellicist account of the
British state in the eighteenth century. See Pincus, supra note 153, at 40.

